Do Conglomerate Firms Allocate Resources Ine±ciently?
Several recent academic papers and the business press claim that conglomerate¯rms destroy value and do a poor job of investing across business segments.
1 Explanations for this underperformance share the idea that there is an imperfection either in¯rm governance (agency theory) or in¯nancial markets (incorrect valuation of¯rm industry segments). These studies implicitly assume that the conglomerates and single-industry¯rms possess similar ability to compete, and that they di®er mainly in that conglomerates have chosen to operate in more than one industry. However,¯rms do di®er in their ability to exploit market opportunities.
2
In the absence of a benchmark model of how these di®erences a®ect¯rms' returns from investing in di®erent divisions, it is not clear whether earlier studies' results are driven by the underlying comparative advantages of di®erent types of¯rms or by one or more of the postulated explanations.
In this paper, we analyze size and growth across industries in the absence of market imperfections, using a neoclassical model based on Lucas (1978) .
3 In our model a conglomerate discount caused by di®erences in underlying¯rm organizational or managerial ability can arise endogenously. We obtain predictions on how¯rms should allocate resources optimally across business segments in the absence of agency problems. These predictions di®er from predictions arising from models predicting ine±cient investment. We test these predictions by examining the growth and productivity of over 50,000¯rms and their business segments using plant-level data for the period 1974 to 1992. By using this plant-level data we can determine how the growth of a multiple-segment¯rm depends on each segment's productivity and relative demand in those industries.
We make three central empirical contributions. First, our empirical analysis shows that conglomerate¯rms are less productive than single-segment¯rms of a similar size, for all but the smallest¯rms. Thus,¯nding is consistent with¯nding of a conglomerate discount by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) . 4 The¯nding raises the possibility that single-segment and diversi¯ed¯rms operating in the same industry do not have the same 1 Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) document a conglomerate discount in the stock market and low returns to conglomerate¯rms. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (1997) and Scharfstein (1997) examine conglomerate investment across di®erent business segments. Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1997) examine the relation of investment to cash°ow for conglomerate industry segments. For an example from the business press see \Then There Will be Two," New York Times, business section, October 13, 1998.
2 Peters and Waterman (1982) , Schmalensee (1985) , and many other authors, have noted that¯rms di®er even within the same markets. Lang and Stulz (1994) note that¯rms that become conglomerates may di®er from those that stay within one industry.
3 Firm growth has been examined in other contexts by Evans (1987) and Hall (1987) . They test whether the relationship between¯rm growth and¯rm size is constant for di®erent types of¯rms, as predicted by Gibrat's Law. 4 It is also consistent with recent evidence by Campa and Kedia (1999) and Villalonga (1999) which document that the conglomerate discount may arise endogenously. investment opportunities.
Second, we also show that the productivity pattern within a conglomerate¯rm's divisions is consistent with our simple value-maximizing model. The model predicts, and wē nd empirically, that larger divisions of conglomerate¯rms are more e±cient than smaller divisions. The largest divisions of conglomerates with multiple segments are particularly e±cient.
Third, we also examine the growth and investment of conglomerate¯rms across the divisions they operate. We¯nd that conglomerate resource allocation is generally consistent with our model of e±cient allocation of resources across business segments. Conglomeratē rms grow more in divisions in which they are productive when that industry receives a positive demand shock and when their other division receives a negative shock.
Our model shows that¯rms with a comparative advantage, arising from¯rm skill in producing within an industry, have higher growth and attain a larger size in that industry. As a¯rm's returns to growing within an industry diminish, the¯rm limits its growth within the industry and moves into other industries. The optimal number and size of industry segments a¯rm operates depends on its comparative advantage across industries. Firms that are very productive in a speci¯c industry have higher opportunity costs of diversifying. Thus, in equilibrium, if a high level of¯rm organizational skill is industry speci¯c, single-segment rms are more productive than conglomerates of the same total size. Comparative advantage also implies that the larger divisions of conglomerates are relatively more productive than their smaller divisions.
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The model also predicts that the e®ect of demand shocks on the growth of a conglomerate's division depends on the division's productivity. The same positive shock that causes rms that are more productive than their industry to increase their market share also can cause less productive¯rms to sell capacity and decrease their size. Thus, less productive and more productive¯rms should invest di®erently when industry conditions change. This result implies that empirical tests of how conglomerates invest in response to changes in industry prospects could be misspeci¯ed if they do not control for the productivity of thē rm's individual divisions. A key prediction of the model is that demand shocks faced by a segment of a conglomerate¯rm a®ect the growth rates of other segments, and do so even in the absence of agency costs and¯nancial market imperfections. If a¯rm's division is more (less) productive than 5 Our model analyzes how comparative advantage in the product market may lead some¯rms to become conglomerates. Models that predict that¯rms become conglomerates to bene¯t from more e±cient capital allocation include Matsusaka and Nanda (2000) , Stein (1997) and Fluck and Lynch (1996) . Hubbard and Palia (1998) present evidence from the 1960s that is consistent with these models. Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (1998) provide more recent evidence consistent with a capital allocation bene¯t of conglomerates. Our approach is closest to the model of Matsusaka (2001) where conglomerate¯rms have a¯rm-speci¯c organizational ability that has di®erent value in di®erent industries. In Matsusaka¯rms have to experiment to¯nd out if their organizational ability has value in a speci¯c industry. Experimentation has dynamic value although it may produce static ine±ciency.
its other divisions, a positive demand shock for that division decreases (increases) the growth rates of other segments. Because models that postulate ine±cient internal capital markets imply a di®erent relation, this prediction can be used to distinguish empirically between these models and our neoclassical model.
Our¯nding that larger segments have higher average productivity than smaller segments is consistent with maximizing behavior when¯rms expand until marginal returns are equal across segments. The di®erences in productivity across segments also suggest that for most rms organizational talent has an industry-speci¯c component. However, when divisions within a conglomerate are ranked by size, and compared with equally ranked divisions of other conglomerates, we¯nd a positive relation between the segment's productivity and the number of industries in which the conglomerates operate. This suggests that those conglomerates that operate in many segments have a higher level of general ability than conglomerates that operate in a few segments.
While these comparisons of the productivities within conglomerate¯rms are consistent with a neoclassical model, they might also occur if conglomerates suboptimally expand into industries in which they have a low level of speci¯c skill. To discriminate between these two possibilities, we examine how conglomerates grow in di®erent industries. We test whether the growth rate of a division is related to the productivity of the conglomerate's divisions and how growth changes in response to industry shocks.
The empirical tests show that the growth of both more-and less-productive¯rm segments is related to productivity and fundamental industry factors, both in recession and expansion periods. Divisions of conglomerates grow more slowly if the conglomerates other divisions are more productive in their industries, and faster if their other divisions are less productive. We also¯nd similar results for investment. Investment is higher if the conglomerate's division are more productive.
We do¯nd some evidence to indicate that some conglomerates may have agency problems. We examine conglomerates that experience signi¯cant restructuring. 6 We¯nd that the growth of these broken-up conglomerates is not consistent with our model of optimal growth. However, even for these¯rms, we¯nd no evidence that conglomerates subsidize the growth of unproductive divisions. We also¯nd that the growth rates of¯rms that remain conglomerates, which are the majority of conglomerates, are strongly sensitive to industry variables and productivity. These¯ndings are consistent with optimal behavior. The results indicate that the surviving conglomerates grow e±ciently across their business segments.
Our work follows prior papers by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) , who show that conglomerate¯rms have a discount in the stock market relative to single-segment rms. Comment and Jarrell (1995) document that stock market returns to conglomerate ¯rms are lower. Berger and Ofek (1995) and Comment and Jarrell (1995) explain their ndings by appealing to agency theories that predict a misallocation of capital as¯rms allocate capital to divisions that are under-performing. Lang and Stulz (1994) note that poorly performing¯rms may choose to become conglomerates. However, they¯nd only limited evidence for this hypothesis, and their data does not permit them to examine how productivity varies by segment. Lamont (1997) and Shin and Stulz (1998) examine how investment is related to industry Tobin's q and cash°ow. Scharfstein (1997) ¯nds that conglomerate¯rms invest more in low-q industries if managerial ownership is low. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) ¯nd that the extent of¯rm investment in divisions in low-q industries is related to the diversity of investment opportunities across divisions. However, there is one large limitation to these studies. These studies proxy for investment opportunities for conglomeratē rms using an industry Tobin's q, calculated from single-segment¯rms. Using an industry Tobin's q implicitly assumes that all¯rms, conglomerates and single-segment¯rms, have similar investment opportunities within an industry and should increase investment when the industry single-segment q increases.
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The paper is organized as follows. Our framework is discussed in Section I. We discuss data and our methodology in Section II. Section III presents our results on growth and segment productivity for multiple-segment conglomerate and single-industry¯rms. We discuss the relationship of our work to other research in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
I. Optimal Firm Size and Growth
We analyze a simple model that illustrates the trade-o®s that determine the extent of rm diversi¯cation when¯rms maximize pro¯ts. The model yields testable predictions on how optimal growth in di®erent industries is a®ected both by the comparative advantage of the¯rm in each industry and by changes in industry conditions. In subsequent sections we take the predictions of our model to data and show how it can be used to provide a pro¯t-maximizing benchmark for the level of¯rm growth and investment across industries.
To capture di®erences in organizational or managerial talent, we assume that in each industry some¯rms operate plants more productively than other¯rms. As in Lucas (1978) , rms di®er because managerial and organizational talent varies across¯rms.
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In each industry,¯rms with higher ability or skill can produce more output with the same amount of input, and thus have higher productivity, than¯rms with lower organizational ability or talent. Thus, di®erences in talent have greater economic signi¯cance when output prices are high. The productivity with which any given¯rm operates plants can di®er across industries in which it operates.
We also assume that any given manager will do a better job of managing a small¯rm than a large¯rm. This follows Coase (1937) and Lucas (1978) in assuming diseconomies of scale within¯rms. Firms use the variables input, labor, and capacity units to produce output. Firms exhibit neoclassical decreasing returns-to-scale, so that their marginal costs increase with output.
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In our model¯rms produce in industries in which they have a comparative advantage. This yields predictions about how the equilibrium diversi¯cation across industries of conglomerates depends on the organizational talent and the correlation of abilities across industries. Second, the model yields testable predictions on how optimal growth in di®erent industries is a®ected both by the comparative advantage of the¯rm in each industry, and by changes in industry conditions. The predictions of our model di®er from those of models that focus on the role of free cash°ow. As a result, our model can be used to distinguish empirically between neoclassical and theories that focus on ine±cient internal capital markets of conglomerate¯rms.
A. The¯rst-best equilibrium with conglomerate¯rms
For concreteness, consider a population of¯rms that can operate in a maximum of two industries, which we denote industry A and industry B; respectively. All¯rms are assumed to be price-takers, to produce a homogeneous output, and to be endowed with industryspeci¯c homogeneous production capacity. Firms use two inputs: capital capacity k and labor l: For tractability we assume that each unit of capacity produces one unit of output. For each¯rm j, the pro¯t function is
where p i and r i are the prices of output and capacity in industry i = A or B, u and w are cost parameters, and k ij is the output of¯rm j in industry i: We model di®erential productivity by d ij : Firms that have a higher productivity, d ij ; produce more output for a given level of inputs. The pro¯t function embodies the assumption of neoclassical diminishing returns within each industry (the terms ul 2 Aj and ul 2 Bj ) and the assumption that when organizational talent is a scarce resource, costs depend on the¯rm's total size (the term w(l Aj + l Bj )
2 ).
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For simplicity, we assume that the production technology requires one unit of labor per unit 9 We focus on decreasing returns in each industry in the formal modeling. However, similar results may be obtained if variable costs within each industry are constant but investment projects in each industry are not homogeneous, so that¯rms invest in the highest return projects in the industry¯rst. Alternatively, if output markets are imperfectly competitive in the Cournot sense, the return on marginal investment will be lower as capacity increases.
10 The term w(l Aj + l Bj ) 2 captures the assumption that expansion in one segment a®ects costs in other segments. Alternatively, the term could be replaced by wl Aj l Bj : While this speci¯cation makes the assumption more transparent, it requires additional parameter restrictions to ensure that the pro¯t function is well behaved. Either speci¯cation results in the same testable predictions.
of capacity. Initially, we analyze the¯rm's output decision taking p i and r i as exogenous. When we consider the e®ects of demand shocks, we allow p i and r i to adjust endogenously.
Optimal outputs by the¯rms in each industry can be obtained by direct optimization. Dropping the¯rm subscripts and de¯ning v i = d i p i ¡ r i , it is easily shown that the optimum output for a¯rm, assuming conglomerate production, is given by
for v B > wv A =(u + w) and v B < (u + w)v A =w: For values of v A ; v B outside of this range, ā rm will choose to be a single-segment¯rm. Figure 1 illustrates which¯rms choose to be either conglomerates or single-segment rms. Letting µ = (u + w)=w, we can rewrite the conditions under which a¯rm chooses to be a conglomerate as: Specialization is optimal if the¯rm is much more productive in one industry than the other; diversi¯cation is optimal if the productivities are similar. Thus, the decision to diversify depends in part on the¯rm's comparative productivity in the two industries. An implication of this result is that, all else being equal, a conglomerate's large division is more productive than its small division.
In the absence of¯nancial market imperfections and agency costs one might observe diversi¯ed¯rms of di®erential productivity, as well as focused¯rms with very unproductive small peripheral segments in other industries. Furthermore, divisions of conglomerate¯rms and single-segment¯rms in the same industry may di®er in productivity and size. Thus, the empirical tests in the corporate¯nance literature, which, for the most part, implicitly assume that the investment opportunities of conglomerates' divisions and single-segment¯rms are similar, are likely to be misspeci¯ed.
The relation between productivity and focus in a population of¯rms depends both on the distribution of ability within these¯rms and on the distribution of ability across rms. If organizational talent (productivity in our context) is industry-speci¯c,¯rms that are highly productive in one industry are likely to be less productive in the other industry. Firms whose managers are not as highly skilled in any one industry are less focused. By contrast, if organizational talent is not industry-speci¯c, so that d A = d B , all¯rms divide their production equally between the industries. In this case, there is no relation between productivity and focus, and there are no di®erences in productivity across segments. Larger rms, however, are more productive than smaller¯rms across all segments.
A generalization of the model shows that this pattern persists across multiple industries. We illustrate the e®ects across multiple industries using two numerical examples that show how di®erences in organizational talent across industries causes¯rms to choose to operate segments of di®erent sizes and di®erent observed productivities. The generalization provides testable predictions about the relation between diversi¯cation and relative productivity.
In each example we take the number of industries to be ten. We assume there are 25,000 potential¯rms, each of which is assigned¯rm-speci¯c ability for each of the ten industries. In terms of the previous discussion and the empirical work, high ability is the same as high productivity. We draw the ability assignment d from a normal distribution with a mean ability of 1 and a standard deviation of 0.5. The output and input prices and the cost parameters in all industries are held constant, (in this case p = 200; r = 200; u = 5; w = 2). In the¯rst example¯rm ability is industry-speci¯c. Firms' ability to manage in one industry is independent of their ability to manage in the other industries. Thus, the draws are independent and identically distributed both within¯rms and across¯rms. In the second example, there is a¯rm-speci¯c e®ect: the draws within a¯rm for each of the ten industries are correlated. We draw the common ability from a normal distribution with a mean equal to 0 and standard deviation equal to 0.25. We add this common ability to the random industry ability drawn earlier. Thus, part of a¯rm's ability can be applied equally to all industries. In each case we determine the industries in which it is optimal for each rm to produce and also the amount of each¯rms' production in each industry, given the price of output and the prices of inputs. We keep track separately of¯rms that choose to produce in one industry only, two industries only, etc., up to¯rms that choose to produce in all the industries (if such¯rms exist). Thus, we have simulated data on one-segment¯rms, two-segment¯rms, etc. For all¯rms with a given number of segments, we rank the segments by size, and we compute the mean¯rm ability d for that segment.
Insert Figure 2a here Figure 2a below illustrates the case in which the assignment of¯rm ability is independent across industries in which the¯rm produces. Each row contains the average of productivity by segment number for¯rms with a given number of segments. The¯gure shows how average¯rm talent in the economy varies by the number of segments a¯rm operates in and by segment rank. As predicted, the¯gure shows that within¯rms the main segments of conglomerates are better managed than peripheral segments. As we go across the number of segments in which a¯rm operates, equally ranked segments at¯rst become more productive and then less productive. The drop-o® in productivity occurs because it is very unlikely that any single¯rm is productive in all ten industries. Thus,¯rms that choose to produce in many industries are likely to have mediocre ability in all of them. In this example, nō rms in the sample produce in all the industries. A simple OLS regression on the simulated data shows that¯rms' mean productivity is positively and signi¯cantly related to their focus, measured by the her¯ndahl index, and size.
Insert Figure 2b here
In Figure 2b we allow¯rm ability in each division to have a¯rm-speci¯c component. We still see that the main segments are more productive than the peripherals. However, now equally ranked segments are more productive in¯rms that operate in more segments. Firms that choose to operate in many segments are more productive in general. Interestingly, a simple OLS regression shows that¯rms' mean productivity is again positively and signi¯cantly related to their focus, measured by the her¯ndahl index, and size, albeit less so than with no common¯rm talent.
These examples show that while the model makes predictions about the distribution of rms' production, this distribution of production across industries depends on the distribution of ability. As we show below, they are consistent with empirical data. However, they do not help di®erentiate the model from other models, such as empire-building models, which predict that¯rms ine±ciently expand into industries outside their core competence. To help di®erentiate the ine±cient internal capital markets and the neo-classical views, we extend the model to yield predictions on how conglomerates respond to demand shocks in industries in which they operate.
B. Shocks and Growth of Conglomerate Firms
To analyze the e®ect of price shocks on¯rm size more formally we describe how the market for capacity works. Assume that there is one period and two dates: t = 1; 2: At time t = 1, the¯rms learn the actual realization of a price shock ¢p A in the next period's output level in industry A. A market for capacity opens in which¯rms can purchase or sell capacity units at a price r A : Following an output price shock, there is an adjustment in the price of capacity ¢r A , so that supply again equals demand for capacity. Firms can choose to use all their capacity to produce, to sell some capacity to other¯rms that value capacity more after the shock and use the remainder to produce themselves, or to buy more capacity and produce. Firms may also choose to buy or sell capacity in industry B at price r B in response to the new market prices in industry A. These transactions may cause the price of capacity in industry B; r B and the price output p B to adjust. In both industries, capacity may be purchased from and sold to other¯rms operating in the same industry, or from the suppliers of new capacity. We assume that the supply of capacity is not perfectly elastic, re°ecting the addition of new capacity (for high levels of r A ) and sales for scrap (for low levels of r A ). Finally, at time t = 2; the¯rm realizes the cash°ows. For simplicity, we assume that capacity has no salvage value at t = 2:
The model can be solved as follows: For each¯rm and each industry we derive the demand for capacity as a function of the market prices for the output good p i , i = A; B which are given exogenously, and the prices of capacity r i , which are endogenous. Then we sum up these demands and equate the total demand for capacity to the supply of capacity in each industry, which may itself depend on r i . This allows us to solve for the equilibrium price of capacity r i . Given r i , we can then, in principle,¯nd out the sizes of all the producers in each industry. Then following an output price shock we can solve for a new r i and the new sizes of¯rms.
11 The sales and purchases can then, in principle, be determined by comparing the new and the old sizes of all¯rms.
We begin by analyzing how a conglomerate's segment's production responds to demand shocks in other segments and in its own segment. Since we are only interested in characterizing how the sizes of di®erent types of¯rms change after a price shock, we do not solve for the sales explicitly. Instead, we adopt a partial equilibrium approach and show how industry characteristics of interest a®ect a¯rm's size relative to other¯rms following a shock. For simplicity, we also assume that the e®ect of demand shocks in industry A only a®ects prices in that industry, and that price e®ects in the other industry are of a second order. 
Growth of Conglomerates Across Industry Segments
Following a price shock in industry A, the growth of a¯rm's output is positively related to d A £ ¢p A ¡ ¢r A .
13 The initial price shock in industry A and the corresponding change in the price of capacity have opposite e®ects on the¯rm's optimal output. Their net e®ect depends on the¯rm's ability d A . Consider¯rst highly productive¯rms. For such¯rms the marginal positive e®ect of a price rise d A £ ¢p A outweighs the e®ect of an increase in the cost of capacity ¢r A : As a result, such¯rms increase their output in industry A: To increase output they either purchase new capacity or acquire existing capacity from other¯rms. The higher the ability d A ; the more capacity a¯rm adds in response to an increase in p A: As the conglomerate¯rm adds capacity in industry A in response to a positive demand shock, the opportunity cost of its organizational talent increases. This, makes it optimal to reduce the¯rm's output in industry B below what it would otherwise have been. Thus, following a positive price shock in industry A the¯rm will refocus its operations out of industry B: This magnitude of e®ect is positively related to d A :
The e®ect of a price shock in industry A on the marginal producers is more ambiguous. The expansion by the productive¯rms in industry A may bid up the price of capacity in the industry. If this e®ect is minor, then the marginal¯rms also expand in industry A. However, if the price of capacity is bid up su±ciently high so that ¢r A . is larger than d A £ ¢p A for some¯rms, then these marginal producers in A¯nd it optimal to sell out to more productive producers and focus instead in industry B: These¯rms' operations in industry A decline not only relatively to those of more productive¯rms, but in absolute size as well. Thus, for example, a conglomerate whose core operations are in B; may decide to sell a marginally productive unit in industry A when industry A receives a positive price shock and that peripheral's capacity becomes more valuable.
We show this more formally in the Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Demand Shocks and Focus) A positive price shock in industry A provides incentives for conglomerates that are productive in industry A to focus in that industry. If the supply of capacity in industry A is su±ciently inelastic, conglomerates that were marginal producers in industry A have an incentive to focus in industry B.
Proof:
From equations (2) and (3) the ratio of outputs of a conglomerate in industry A and industry B is
The e®ect of a price shock in industry A is given by the following expression 13 These e®ects are obtained directly from equation (2).
A necessary condition for the¯rm to be a conglomerate is that (d B p B ¡ r B ) > 0: Therefore the sign of this expression depends on the relative magnitude of d A and dr A dp A . We expect that dr A dp A¸0
: If the¯rm is very productive, then d A > dr A dp A ; even for dr A dp A > 0: For less productive¯rms it may be that d A < dr A dp A ; so that the¯rm refocuses in industry B:QED Since the size of a¯rm's operations is industry A is positively related to d A ; expression (4) directly yields a prediction about the e®ect of demand shocks in an industry on the¯rm's operations. Corollary 1 The greater the productivity of a conglomerate's operations in an industry; the greater the e®ect of price shocks in that industry on the optimal size of operations of the conglomerate in other industries.
We thus would expect that shocks in a conglomerate's main segment (which, all else being equal, has a higher relative productivity) would produce greater e®ects on the industries in which it has its peripheral segments than if the opposite were true.
In the previous proposition, we focus on the e®ect of shocks on the relative size of the conglomerate's operations in each industry. Some of our empirical tests will compare the growth rates of segments within the same industry belonging to di®erent conglomerates. The underlying intuition carries over to that case. In particular, the following result will be exploited in our empirical tests:
Proposition 3 (Demand Shocks and Growth ) Given a positive price shock in industry A, a conglomerate that is more productive in industry A will grow more slowly in industry B than an otherwise similar conglomerate which is less productive in industry A. Given a negative price shock in industry A, the relative growth rates of the two conglomerates in industry B are reversed.
Consider two conglomerates, where conglomerate i has productivities of (d The ratio of the outputs of conglomerate i to that of conglomerate j in industry B is given by
In response to a shock to p A ; the change in the ratio of outputs in industry B is given by
This sign of the expression depends on the sign of d
A :QED Note that we do not predict this pattern of growth across conglomerates business units because of agency problems within a conglomerate or because of the workings of conglomeratē rms' internal capital markets. Rather, they result from the comparative advantage of conglomerates main and peripheral segments over di®erent ranges of demand.
In measuring empirically the e®ects of price shocks in one division on growth rates of other divisions that we analyze above, we also need to control for the e®ect of own-industry shocks on the growth rates of producers. It is straightforward to show that a more productive producer adds more capacity than a less productive producer when its industry receives a positive demand shock. However, this does not necessarily imply that the growth rate of a producer following a positive demand shock is positively related to its productivity.
The key determinant of relative growth rates of¯rms within an industry following a demand shock is the extent to which the price of capacity changes relative to the price of output. When the price of output increases, more productive producers are willing to bid up the price of capacity higher than less productive producers. If the supply of capacity responds slowly to increases in demand, than the price of capacity may increase at a faster rate than the price of output. As a result, the more productive¯rms outbid the less productive¯rms, and the latter either invest more slowly, or maximize value by becoming sellers of capacity to more productive¯rms.
14 More productive¯rms not only add more capacity than less productive¯rms, as discussed earlier, but also become relatively larger. Conversely, if the supply of capacity is su±ciently elastic, then capacity becomes cheaper relative to the price of output following a positive demand shock, and less productive¯rms will grow faster relative to more productive¯rms.
In general we expect that the supply of new capacity is inelastic, especially when the economy is producing at capacity. Given the result of Proposition 1 that main units of a conglomerate is more e±cient than its peripheral units, we would expect that main units grow faster than peripherals when the industry receives a positive shock. In recessions, the opportunity cost of capacity may be its salvage value so that the supply of capacity is elastic, and we would expect that main units to be cut less than peripherals when the industry receives a negative demand shock. We examine this prediction in the empirical work below.
C. Relation of our Model to the Agency Literature
An alternative view of the¯rm posits that the¯rms do not maximize pro¯ts. According to this view, the¯rm's investment policy is driven by opportunistic agents (usually the managers or the owners of a subset of the¯rm's securities), who attempt to distort the policy for their private bene¯t (see, Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986)). We next discuss whether the comparative-static predictions derived above are also consistent with the agency view.
To the extent that the agents' opportunistic behavior is fully controlled by the¯rms' owners, the agency model is observationally equivalent to the pro¯t maximizing model presented here. If opportunistic behavior is not fully checked, then the¯rm's investment policy may deviate from the pro¯t-maximizing policy. Whether the opportunistic behavior leads to di®erent predictions depends on the type of investment deviation. We consider three cases.
First, the agents may invest optimally, but divert a portion of the proceeds for their own bene¯ts as higher overhead at the¯rm level or as overpayments for acquisitions. Our tests cannot detect this type of divergence as the¯rm's growth policy might still be very similar to that of the pro¯t-maximizing¯rms. However, the diversion may involve higher payments to some factor of production (investment, labor, or materials). In that case the link between measured productivity and investment would be broken, and the comparative-static predictions of the pro¯t-maximizing model may be rejected.
Second, the agents may have a private bene¯t from investment in capacity (this view is explored by Jensen (1986) and Matsusaka and Nanda (2000)). In that case¯rms invest more than is predicted by the pro¯t-maximizing model developed above but still allocate resources to the division with the highest marginal return. Jensen (1986) and the subsequent literature on free-cash°ow does not model di®erences in the productivity of¯rms, so the predictions of those models about responses to demand shocks di®er from those derived in Proposition 2 above. However, the pro¯t-maximizing model above can be extended to allow for the private bene¯t to the agents that control the¯rm. Firms in the extended model over-invest, but the comparative statics of the model with respect to demand shocks and di®erences in technology are similar to those of the pro¯t-maximizing model.
15 As a result, tests based on these comparative statics cannot reject the existence of private bene¯ts of investment. However, by the same token, the hypothesis that such bene¯ts are signi¯cant is not necessary to derive these predictions.
Third, opportunistic behavior by agents may cause¯rms to misallocate resources across segments. The misallocations may occur either because of internal con°icts within the¯rm or because¯rms diversify into industries in which they have insu±cient expertise. These possibilities are suggested by prior work by Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998) , Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) and Scharfstein and Stein (2000) . Lamont (1997) contends that peripherals of¯rms in the oil industry are subsidized by the oil divisions when the oil division receives a positive price shock. Shin and Stulz (1998) ¯nd that investment of conglomerates' divisions is a®ected by cash°ows in other divisions. The model by Scharfstein and Stein (2000) implies that weaker divisions get subsidized by stronger ones. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) argue that the investment by conglomerates with diverse opportunities depends on internal con°icts, so that they do not predict that such conglomerates will concentrate their growth in their relatively most productive segments. To the extent that such misallocation is material, our predictions developed above will be rejected by the data.
In sum, the comparative static predictions developed above allow us to test the hypothesis that¯rms allocate resources e±ciently across divisions. They do not directly test the hypothesis that there are private bene¯ts of control. However, to the extent that the predictions are not rejected by the data, they suggest that resource allocation within conglomerates is consistent with pro¯t maximization. Finally, we do not address the question of whether rms allocate resources e±ciently across segments, but subsequently waste the cash°ows through higher overhead.
II. Empirical Analysis: Firm Growth and Investment
We examine how industry demand, and¯rm-speci¯c productivity a®ect the investment and growth of¯rm segments. Our null hypothesis is that the growth and investment decisions of conglomerate¯rms are consistent with pro¯t maximizing behavior derived in Section I.
We use three approaches to testing the predictions of our model. First, we calculate the productivities of conglomerates (main and peripheral industry segments) and of singlesegment¯rms, and examine whether they accord with the patterns predicted in Proposition 2. While this test could reject our model, it does not allow us to di®erentiate between the model and other models which posit that conglomerates invest in peripheral segments for non pro¯t-maximizing reasons.
Second, to di®erentiate between our model and models that predict ine±cient growth, we examine and test the growth patterns of conglomerates and compare them to growth patterns of single-segment¯rms. We also examine the investment decisions of conglomeratē rms. One of our model's key predictions is that¯rms invest di®erently across business segments based on comparative advantage in productivity. Speci¯cally, we test the prediction of Proposition 3 that conglomerates will grow less in a particular segment if their other segment(s) is (are) more productive and if their other segment(s) experiences a larger positive demand shock. Models which posit ine±cient cross-subsidization do not predict this relation. Rather, they suggest that positive shocks in other segments provide additional resources for the expansion of peripherals.
Finally, as a robustness check, we identify a subsample of \failed" conglomerates that were split up or have had substantial declines in the number of segments they operate over our sample period. If market forces are important in breaking up those conglomerates that have agency problems, then the failed conglomerates will be less likely to follow optimal policies than will the complementary subsample of conglomerates that survive. Thus, by comparing the¯t of our model in the two subsamples, we can check whether our regressions are detecting optimal resource allocation.
A. Data
We examine both multiple-segment conglomerate¯rms and single-segment¯rms by using an unbalanced panel for the period 1975 to 1992. To be in our sample,¯rms must have manufacturing operations producing products in SIC codes 2000-3999. We require¯rms to meet these criteria because of the unique nature of the micro-level data that we use to calculate plant-level productivity and industry growth.
We use data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), maintained by the Center for Economic Studies at the Bureau of the Census.
16 The LRD database contains detailed plant-level data on the value of shipments produced by each plant, investments broken down by equipment and buildings, and the number of employees.
The LRD tracks approximately 50,000 manufacturing plants every year in the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The ASM covers all plants with more than 250 employees. Smaller plants are randomly selected every¯fth year to complete a rotating¯ve-year panel.
Note that while the annual data is called the Annual Survey of Manufactures, reporting is not voluntary for large plants and is not voluntary once a smaller¯rm is selected to participate. All data has to be reported to the government by law and¯nes are levied for misreporting.
There are several advantages to this database: First, it covers both public and privatē rms in manufacturing industries. Second, coverage is at the plant level, and output is assigned by plants at the four-digit SIC code level. Thus,¯rms that produce under multiple SIC codes are not assigned to just one industry. Third, plant-level coverage means that we can track plants even as they change owners. One of the biggest advantages for this study is that the coverage accurately represents in which industries a multi-segment¯rm operates. Segment data reported by COMPUSTAT is subject to reporting biases. Firms have considerable°exibility in how they report segments as shown by Pacter (1993) . Firms may also have strategic reasons for the speci¯c segments they choose or choose not to report, as Hayes and Lundholm (1996) shows. In addition, Hyland (1999)¯nds that only 72 percent of¯rms that report under the FASB standards that they go from one segment to more than one segment actually increase their number of segments.
However, there are limitations of our data and the conclusions that can be reached from this study. The data base only covers manufacturing industries. We cannot track transfer pricing and this may a®ect some of the cost measures, especially for vertically integrated rms and also for multinationals. In addition, our data does not cover overhead or research and development at the corporate headquarters level. Thus, our tests and conclusions pertain to the resource allocation between divisions and do not address expenditures at the headquarters level. In addition, since our data does not distinguish between private and public¯rms, we cannot pick up the extent to which that privately traded conglomerates allocate resources e±ciently while public ones do not.
We con¯ne our analysis to 1974 through 1992. Given we construct measures of productivity (described in the next section) using 5 years of data, our regressions cover the period 1979-1992. We also exclude segments (at the three-digit SIC code) of¯rms with total value of shipments less than $1 million in real value of shipments. We require each plant to have two years of data. After these requirements, we are able to construct productivity measures for 767,098 plant-year observations. We aggregate our data into¯rm business-segment units at the three-digit SIC code from the individual plant-level data, giving us 374,339 segmentyear observations. We also exclude segments which have continuously compounded annual growth rates greater than 100% in absolute value. Imposing this last requirement leaves us 266,146 segment-year observations.
17
We classify¯rms as single segment or multiple segment, based on the three-digit SIC code. We use two cut-o®s for classifying a¯rm as a conglomerate, 2.5 percent and 10 percent. We classify a¯rm as a multi-segment¯rm if it produces more than 2.5 percent (10 percent) of its sales outside its principal three-digit SIC code. To facilitate comparison with prior research, we report regression results (except for Table IV where we report results for both cuto®s) using the 10 percent cuto®.
18 For multiple-segment¯rms, we also classify each segment as either a main segment or a peripheral segment. Main segments are segments whose value of shipments is at least 25% of the¯rm's total shipments.
B. Variable Selection
In this section we describe the variables used to test our model and how we calculate these variables. The two primary dependent variables we investigate are a¯rm's segment growth and investment. The primary independent variables we use to test the predictions of our model are segment productivity and the change in aggregate industry shipments. We include a segment's lagged size and the lagged number of plants in the segment as control variables. We subtract out the industry average in each year from all segment level variables, except for the number of plants. In addition to these variables, we examine how growth is related to segment operating margin and value added per worker.
B1. Productivity of Business Segments
Our primary measure of performance is total factor productivity (TFP). We calculate productivity for all¯rm segments at the plant level. TFP takes the actual amount of output produced for a given amount of inputs and compares it to a predicted amount of output. \Predicted output" is what the plant should have produced, given the amount of inputs it used. A plant that produces more than the predicted amount of output has a greater-thanaverage productivity. This measure is more°exible than a cash°ow measure, and does not 17 We have also ran tests using a cuto® of $10 million in real value of shipments and also growth rates of 500 percent and less and obtain similar results.
18 An earlier draft of this paper used the 2.5 percent cuto® for all regressions and found similar results.
impose the restrictions of constant returns to scale and constant elasticity of scale that a \dollar in, dollar out" cash°ow measure requires. For robustness and comparability with prior studies, we also explore how segment growth is related to segment operating margin, both of the segment in question and of the conglomerates other segments. However, this measure is di®erent than a typical cash°ow number as we do not have cost measures for indirect divisional level costs such as advertising and research and development as our data is at the plant-level.
In calculating the predicted output of each plant, we assume that for each industry there exists a production function that de¯nes the relation between a plant's inputs and outputs. Then, for each industry we estimate this production function using an unbalanced panel with plant-level¯xed e®ects, using all plants in the industry within our 1974 to 1992 time frame. In estimating the production function we use the last¯ve years of data for each plant -thus the¯rst year of our data for which we have calculated productivity is 1979.
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To calculate a plant's productivity, we assume that the plants in each industry have a translog production function. This functional form is a second-degree approximation to any arbitrary production function, and therefore takes into account interactions between inputs. To estimate predicted outputs, we take the translog production function and run a regression of log of the total value of shipments on the log of inputs, including cross-product and squared terms:
where Q it represents output of plant i in year t; and L jit is the quantity of input j used in production for plant i for time period t. A is a technology shift parameter, assumed to be constant by industry, f i is a plant-¯rm speci¯c¯xed e®ect (if a plant changes owners a new xed e®ect is estimated. We leave o® the¯rm subscript for tractability), and c j = P N i=1 c ji indexes returns-to-scale. Our measure of plant-level productivity is the residual from equation (5) plus the¯xed e®ect, f i . Using a¯xed e®ect is important to capture higher persistent productivity arising from managerial ability as the earliest studies by Griliches (1957) and Mundlak (1961 Mundlak ( , 1978 emphasize. 20 In terms of the model, TFP is p*(d-predicted d). TFP thus captures two e®ects. First, it captures the ability to produce at a higher level for a given amount of inputs. Second, 19 A previous version estimated the production function using all years of data and found similar results. 20 In addition to this speci¯cation for plant productivity, we also estimate three other related speci¯cations. First, we just use the average of the plant¯xed e®ects for the¯rm's division as a measure of¯rm ability in that segment (omitting the residual). Second, we estimate the above regression at the three digit industry segment level, again using a¯rm-industry¯xed e®ect plus the residual as a measure of¯rm ability in that segment. Third, we use just the segment residual as our measure of¯rm ability (omitting the¯xed e®ect), again using¯ve years of past data. These alternative speci¯cations still¯nd a positive, highly signi¯cant relationship between productivity and growth. Other variables also had the same signs and signi¯cance levels.
as measured it also captures the ability to price higher than the industry average, as we de°ate for industry price at the four digit level and also subtract out industry average TFP in each year. Thus, d in the model can be equated with these two factors. We standardize plant-level TFP by dividing by the standard deviation of TFP for each industry. 21 We standardize in this method so that when we include a segment's productivity, we control for the fact that in some industries we are able to estimate productivity more precisely. This correction is analogous to a simple measurement error correction and is similar to the procedure used to produce standardized cumulative excess returns in event studies. Our comparisons of plants' TFP will thus not be driven by di®erences in the dispersion of productivity within each industry. Finally, we compute a segment level productivity at the three-digit SIC code by constructing a weighted average of the individual plant productivities, with weights equal to the predicted output of each plant. Alternative weighting schemes using the total value of inputs gave similar results in regressions. The variable for the productivity of the¯rm's other segments is the weighted average of all of the¯rm's other plants outside of the segment in question. The weights are the predicted plant-level value of shipments.
We also include other¯rm and segment-level variables in our regressions to provide additional control for unmeasured productivity di®erences and other factors, such as size, that can in°uence¯rm growth. We include the log of¯rm size and the number of plants operated by a¯rm at the beginning of the year. We de¯ne¯rm size as the total value of shipments.
In estimating the TFPs in our sample, we use data for over 500,000 plant years, and for approximately 50,000 plants each year. In the productivity regression for each industry, we include three di®erent types of inputs, capital, labor, and materials, as explanatory variables. All these data exist at the plant level. However, the ASM does not state the actual quantity shipped by each plant, but shows only the value of shipments. As a result, we take the di®erence between actual and predicted value of shipments as our measure of TFP. For all inputs and outputs measured in dollars, we adjust for in°ation by using four-digit SIC code data from the Bartelsman and Gray (1994) database. Each input has to have a non-zero reported value. We also require that each plant have at least two years of data. As earlier noted, we then aggregate the plant-level TFP data into¯rm business-segment units at the three-digit SIC code from the individual plant-level data, giving us 374,339 segment-year observations.
The production function approach also assumes that inputs into the production function are measured accurately. For most inputs (cost of materials, energy, workers) the assumption that the reported data are accurate appears reasonable. The data are cross-checked by the Bureau of the Census, and many data items (wages, cost of materials and energy) are the same as the values reported to the IRS. However, for capital stock there are potential problems in using the using reported values in each year. These values could be potentially misstated because of changes in reported values due to acquisitions. Thus to obtain our capital stock measure we use a perpetual accounting method, beginning the plant's capital stock at its¯rst reported level and use industry level depreciation rates from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to adjust the value of the capital stock in each year. Expenditures on buildings and equipment are added to the last year's value adjusted for depreciation. We use data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis to make depreciation adjustments at the two-digit level. This method is similar to the method used to construct the value of capital used to construct Tobin's q. In addition, to capture vintage e®ects of capital, we include plant age in our productivity calculations. Plant age is the¯rst year in which the plant appeared in the database, or 1972 (the¯rst census year of the database which we have) whichever is earlier. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) describe these inputs and the method for accounting for in°ation and depreciation of capital stock in more detail.
As a robustness check, we also report an alternative speci¯cations where we use value added per worker and segment operating margin as our measure of skill or ability. While these productivity measures have potential limitations, checking the consistency of our results across the speci¯cations provides a way of testing robustness of the results we report.
B2. Industry Variables
In order to get a measure of industry demand we use industry shipments at the four-digit SIC code level de°ated using a 1982 industry price de°ator from the Bartelsman and Gray (1994) database. We aggregate this data into the three-digit SIC code level. We detrend this data by regressing the actual value on a yearly time trend and take as our measure of an industry shock the di®erence between the actual and predicted value. We focus on detrended real industry shipments for two reasons. First, the value of capital and of allocating resources to growth in an industry depends on industry growth. Second,¯rms' cash constraints can depend on industry conditions. If¯rms in high-growth industries are less cash-constrained than those in declining industries, then¯rms might have di®erent growth rates.
To determine whether the level of industry demand alters the relation between the productivity and segment growth, we also classify years as recession or expansion years. We determine recession and expansion years by using aggregate and aggregate-detrended industrial production. We de¯ne detrended industrial production as the actual less predicted industrial production, where we calculate predicted industrial production from a regression of industrial production on a time trend. Recession years are years in which both real and detrended industrial production decline relative to the previous year. We classify years as expansion years when both real and detrended industrial production increase relative to the previous year.
This procedure gives us similar results as the NBER recession dating procedure, which NBER does quarterly. It also allows us to classify a year such as 1980, which, according to NBER, had a recession of less than six months. Using this procedure, we classify 1981-1982 and 1990-1991 as recession years and 1976-1978 and 1984-1988 as expansion years. Given that actual and detrended industrial production did not move in the same direction, 1979-1980, 1983, 1989, 1992 are indeterminate years
We also investigate the e®ect of industry cash°ow on segment growth. We calculate industry cash°ow by aggregating all plant-level costs and plant-level value of shipments to the three-digit SIC code. Thus, this measure is di®erent than a typical cash°ow number as we do not have cost data for indirect divisional-level overhead costs as our data is at the plant-level. The results using industry cash°ow are not presented. They are similar to the results presented and are available from the authors.
III. Results
A. Sample Summary Characteristics Table I presents summary statistics for the¯rms in our dataset. We break out the statistics by single-and multiple-segment¯rms. We present both real-growth rates and the proportion of total real-dollar value of shipments by industry segments. We calculate real-growth rates by using individual plant-level shipments de°ated by four-digit SIC code de°ators from the NBER productivity database.
|||||{
Insert Table I here |||||{ Table I shows that from 1980 to 1990, the proportion of output produced by singlesegment¯rms in the U.S. manufacturing sector increased by¯ve percentage points. This increase occurred because of a substantial increase in the number of new single-segment¯rms and because multiple-segment¯rms decreased production in their peripheral segments. We also see that multiple-segment¯rms' main divisions show almost a zero growth rate in recessions, and that single-segment¯rms and peripheral segments of multiple-segment¯rms register negative growth. Finally, the table shows that for both conglomerates and singleindustry¯rms, more productive¯rms grow at substantially higher rates. Table I also shows that average segments of single-segment¯rms are more productivity than those of conglomerate¯rms for all size categories, except for the smallest size segments. The smallest size category, 1¡10 million real dollars, comprise only 3.3 percent of the total conglomerate segments. The table also shows that size is signi¯cantly related to productivity. This nding is consistent with our model.
In Figure 3 we examine how the productivity of conglomerates' segments varies with the size ranking of the segment within the conglomerate, and with the total number of segments. We include the average productivity of each of the segment ranks for¯rms with a particular number of segments. For single-segment¯rms there are a large number of¯rms with total sales less than 10 million dollars, while only a few conglomerate¯rms are less than this size. Given table one shows that size is a critical variable, for comparability between single-and multiple-segment¯rms we only include¯rms with 10 million dollars in real value of shipments in this graph. If we include single-segment¯rms with total shipments less than 10 million dollars in this graph, average single-segment productivity falls to -.05, while conglomerate segment productivity is relatively una®ected.
22 Figure 3 shows that there is a strong negative relation between the segment's rank and its productivity. This is consistent with the neo-classical hypothesis that conglomerates are larger in the segment on which they have a comparative advantage. This within conglomerate drop-o® in productivity in smaller segments suggests that organizational talent has an industry-speci¯c component. |||||{ Insert Figure 3 here |||||{ Figure 3 also shows how the productivity of segments that are equally ranked by size within the conglomerate varies as the number of segments increases. Holding the withinconglomerate rank of a segment constant, its productivity increases as the total number of segments increases. Thus, for example, the mean productivity of the largest segment of a twosegment conglomerate is lower than its industry average, whereas the mean productivity of the largest segment of a conglomerate with more than ten segments or more is higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis that there are a number of large e±cient conglomerates whosē rm organizational talent is portable across industries. A larger number of conglomerates operate in a small number of segments, and are of less than average productivity, even in their best industry. Again, this relation is consistent with the neo-classical model.
The comparison of equally-ranked segments for conglomerates of di®erent sizes suggests that¯rms may become conglomerates for di®erent reasons. Some¯rms may have above average ability that is partially transferable across industries, and may exploit it optimally expanding into several industries. Other¯rms may have less than average ability in their main industry, and may move into a second industry because they have attained their optimal size in their main segment. We would expect the former to be highly valued by the stock market and the latter to have a low valuation. As a result, it is di±cult to interpret conglomerate discounts as evidence of agency problems. Instead, conglomerate discounts and premia may re°ect the underlying distribution of¯rm organizational or managerial ability and the extent to which it is industry speci¯c.
22 Only 3.3 percent of conglomerate segments are a®ected by this higher size cuto® and it has little e®ect on productivity. For example, if we include these smaller segments for conglomerate¯rms, productivity of the main segment of a conglomerate with 2 segments falls to .268 from .286, for a conglomerate with three segments productivity is slightly higher, .407 versus .394. By comparison, 37 percent of single-segment¯rms are between $1 and $10 million 1982 dollars. In our regressions, we do include these smaller segments as we can include control explicitly for size by including a size variable.
B. Growth and productivity over the Business Cycle
We¯rst show how the average real growth and productivity of segments of single-segment and conglomerate¯rms can vary by size. Since our model predicts a di®erent relation between productivity, size, and growth in response to positive and negative industry shocks, we report the results separately for expansion and recession years in the U.S. economy. These results appear in Table II . In this table, we de¯ne the size of each segment as the ratio of the size of the segment to the size of the median segment in the same industry, both measured at the beginning of the year. We only report three of¯ve size classi¯cations in the interest of space. The unreported size classi¯cations for classi¯cations two and four were presented in an earlier version and support similar conclusions as those from size classi¯cations three and ve. |||||{ Insert Table II here |||||{ Table II examines three predictions of our model. First, we test whether single-segment rms are more productive than conglomerate¯rms of a similar size. Second, we test whether the main divisions of conglomerate¯rms are more productive than peripheral divisions. Third, we examine how the relation between growth and productivity during expansions and recessions di®ers for conglomerate¯rms' main and peripheral divisions.
Panel A of Table II shows that single-segment¯rms have signi¯cantly higher productivity than conglomerate¯rms in two of the table's reported three size classes. We also¯nd this result in the unreported second and fourth size classi¯cations. The¯nal column shows that conglomerate main divisions are signi¯cantly more productive than peripheral divisions for all size classes.
The third¯nding in Panel A is that there is a strong positive association between growth and productivity in expansions, and that size is very important to this relation. Firms that are large at the beginning of the year tend to be more productive, but grow at a slower rate than smaller¯rms. This¯nding seems to indicate that smaller¯rms grow much faster than large, productive ones. However, small¯rms tend to have a wider range in productivity. If we look at the most productive 50% of¯rms for each size class, we¯nd that growth rates do increase with productivity. Finally, the table shows that conglomerates grow their productive main divisions at a much faster rate than their less productive peripheral divisions.
These results show that a relation exists between productivity and segment type, and that it is consistent with our model. As a result of this relation, the main and peripheral segments of conglomerates should not be investing similarly when there is a positive industry shock to demand.
In recessions we¯nd the following: First, for each size class,¯rm growth increases with productivity for single-segment¯rms and for divisions of conglomerates. Second, conglomerate¯rms cut growth much more in their peripheral divisions than in their main divisions. Sales in their peripheral divisions decrease sharply, although for some size classes, the main divisions actually grow in real terms in the recession years. Finally, single-segment¯rms are more a®ected by recessions than main divisions of conglomerate¯rms, but nevertheless show higher growth rates than do the peripheral divisions of the conglomerate¯rms.
We also explore the average annual growth rates for single-segment and multiple-segment rms during recession and expansion years for segments of di®erent levels of productivity. Our model predicts that the di®erence between the growth rates of high and low productivitȳ rms should be lower during recessions than expansions. Thus, we compare the industryadjusted annual growth rates of the most productive quartile of¯rm segments with the quartile of least productive segments. We¯nd that the di®erence in annual growth rates between the most-and least-productive quartiles of industry segments was two to 2.5 percentage points higher in expansion years than in recession years.
Speci¯cally, the di®erence in the growth rates between the main divisions of conglomeratē rms in the highest productivity quartile and the main divisions in the lowest productivity quartile is two percentage points more during expansion years than during recession years. For single-segment¯rms and peripheral segments, the di®erence in growth rates between segments in the highest and lowest productivity quartiles is 2.5 percentage points higher in expansions than in recessions.
Before we examine the regression results, we can draw three conclusions. First, during both expansions and recessions, growth increases with productivity for nearly all size-based classi¯cations. Second, productive¯rms grow faster in expansion years than during recession years. This¯nding supports the prediction of our model that positive shocks e®ect more productive¯rms di®erently. Third, peripheral segments experience the worst real growth declines in recession years. This may imply that conglomerate¯rms either use their peripheral divisions to subsidize main divisions. Alternatively, conglomerates could be cutting back on low productivity divisions in response to large negative industry shocks, as predicted by the neoclassical model when supply of capacity is elastic which is more likely to be the case in a recession.
We also examined whether the disparity in the performance of conglomerate¯rms' main divisions and their peripheral divisions can be explained by industry di®erences. It could be that peripheral divisions are in low-growth industries and main divisions are in high-growth industries. To control for industry growth, we examined high and low growth quartiles of all industries based on a 12-year real-growth rate of shipments described in the earlier section. Results available from the authors show that separate long-run analyses of high-and lowgrowth industries does not substantively change the previous results. The sharp di®erences between the main and peripheral divisions of conglomerates remain. Peripheral divisions grow at a much slower rate and are less productive both in high-and low-growth industries. Table III examines the e®ect of productivity and industry fundamentals on the realgrowth rates of conglomerate and single-segment¯rms in multivariate regressions. We measure the dependent variable, industry-adjusted segment growth, in real 1982 dollars, subtracting out the industry average for each year. Productivity and segment size are industry adjusted and represent absolute deviations from industry averages in each year.
C. Growth and Relative Productivity with Industry Shocks
Our empirical speci¯cation is motivated by equation (2). Our model predicts that the growth of a segment depends on the interaction between the segment's productivity and the sign of the demand shock in the industry. For positive (negative) shocks, growth is predicted to vary positively (negatively) with productivity. To test for this interaction, we include a variable that interacts the change in industry demand with the segment's productivity.
Proposition 3 of our model also predicts that the growth of a conglomerate¯rm's segment depends on the relative productivity and demand conditions facing the¯rm's other segments. Speci¯cally, we consider how a segment of a given productivity will grow faster (slower) if the¯rm's other, more-productive segments receive negative (positive) shocks and other, less-productive segments receive positive (negative) shocks.
In our regressions, we use two variables to measure how the growth of a conglomeratē rm's segment is a®ected by the¯rm's other segments. First, we measure the productivity of the other segments by weighing the TFP of each segment by its predicted sales. Second, we test for the interaction between the segment's shock and the shocks in other segments by interacting the segment's relative industry demand with the other segments' weighted productivity. We measure relative industry demand by a variable that equals one (zero, minus one) when the segment's change in shipments at the industry level is greater (equal, less) than that of the¯rm's median segment. Our model predicts that this variable will have a negative coe±cient.
For each segment, we control for the segment's productivity (TFP), the total the number of plants owned by the¯rm to which the segment belongs, and the log of¯rm size. The last two variables are lagged to represent values at the beginning of the year. Thus, for every segment, the regressions control for both the segment's own productivity, and for¯rm and industry characteristics.
We estimate the regression for both single-and multiple-segment¯rms. For multiplesegment¯rms we present two di®erent cut-o®s for sales percentage a¯rm has to have in two segments to be classi¯ed as a multiple segment¯rm, both 2.5 percent and ten percent. All subsequent tables are presented using the ten percent cuto® for comparability with previous samples of¯rms using COMPUSTAT. We estimate the regressions using unbalanced panel techniques, with random e®ects at the segment level and allow for correlated residuals within panel units. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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23 Moulton (1987) shows that random e®ects are more consistent if the regressors are subject to measure-|||||{ Insert Table III here |||||{
The regression results in Table III show that both single-and multiple-segment¯rms' growth rates are signi¯cantly and positively related to segment productivity. The sensitivity is signi¯cantly greater for single-segment¯rms than it is for multiple-segment¯rms. The economic e®ects which follow in Table IVb show that this di®erence is not economically very large when we compare single-segment¯rms to the main segments of multiple-segment rms. 24 The number of plants is also negatively related to¯rm growth, which suggests that there are additional decreasing returns to expansion.
The evidence on the interaction e®ects is consistent with the predictions of our model. The own-segment interaction variable, real change in industry shipments times segment productivity, is positive and signi¯cant. Firms increase more in size when they receive a positive shock to a division in which they have high productivity.
When we look at the interaction e®ects for conglomerate¯rms' other divisions, we¯nd evidence that the division's growth rate is a®ected by the prospects of the¯rm's other divisions. As predicted by our model, the segment's growth rate is negatively related to the interaction variable for a conglomerate's other divisions, relative demand times the other segments' relative productivity. Thus, segment growth is lower when the other segments are more e±cient and receive a positive demand shock. The in°uence of the other segments' relative productivity without controlling for demand is insigni¯cant.
To test for robustness across estimation techniques, we ran the regression for conglomerates in Table III as a cross-section for each year in the sample, as in Fama and MacBeth (1973) . We averaged these coe±cients over the individual years. For productivity (TFP), the average of the yearly coe±cients was .047 and was highly signi¯cant, similar to the results for the entire panel we present. For change in industry shipments times TFP, the average of the yearly coe±cients was .0265, with a t-statistic, based on the standard error of the mean of 2.08, not as high of a level of signi¯cance as the regression reported but still signi¯cant. This coe±cient is also bit higher than the reported coe±cient of .019 that we report in Table III . For the coe±cient on \Relative demand times other segments weighted TFP", the average of the yearly coe±cients was -.0048, which is again compares favorably with the reported coe±cient, -.004, for the whole panel in Table III . This average coe±cient had a t-statistic of ment error, while¯xed e®ects are preferred if the regressors are endogenous. Since our TFP measure may be subject to measurement error, we present results using random e®ects. In addition, we estimate this speci¯cation using productivity measured using just a¯xed e®ect (omitting the residual) at the segment level. Again, we¯nd similar results for the sign and signi¯cance of coe±cients.
24 This result is sensitive to how productivity is measured. When productivity is calculated over the whole period, versus just using data from the prior¯ve years, we¯nd growth of conglomerates is more sensitive to productivity than single-segment¯rms.
-2.71, which is more signi¯cant than the reported p-value for the panel of .035. Finally, the average coe±cient on \Other segment's weighted TFP" was -.008, which compares favorably with the panel coe±cient of -.007. The t-statistic based on the standard error on the mean of the yearly coe±cients is -3.18, still highly signi¯cant.
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These results show that¯rms grow faster in segments that are more productive and that rms take into account the prospects of their other segments in a way that is consistent with the neoclassical maximizing¯rms in our model. While we do not have a precise benchmark for the optimal level of growth, the fact that conglomerate industry-adjusted and yearadjusted growth rates are highly sensitive to segment productivity across their segments is consistent with conglomerates making e±cient resource allocation decisions. Table IV estimates the same regressions as Table III , but breaks the conglomerate multiple-segment¯rms into their main and peripheral divisions. In the last column, we test for signi¯cant di®erences in coe±cients between main and peripheral divisions of conglomerates.
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D. Growth of Conglomerates' Main and Peripheral Divisions
|||||{
Insert Table IV here |||||{
The results in Table IV show that both main and peripheral divisions' growth rates have positive sensitivity to relative productivity. The results also show that the peripheral segments are more sensitive to productivity than the main segments. We also¯nd that, consistent with the neoclassical model, the interaction variable, relative demand times other segments' TFP, is signi¯cantly negative for peripheral segments. This variable is more significant for peripheral divisions, as our Corollary 1 predicts. These¯ndings are consistent with e±cient resource allocation to peripheral segments. We¯nd the same predicted negative relationship between growth and the other segments' productivity interacted with relative demand for main divisions, but it is not signi¯cant.
Table IV b examines the economic signi¯cance of our regression results using the estimated coe±cients from the regressions in Tables III and IV . We calculate predicted realgrowth rates of conglomerate and single-segment¯rms, as productivity and change in shipments varies from the 25th to the 75th percentiles. In computing these predicted growth rates, we hold all variables, except productivity, at their sample medians. |||||{ Insert Table IVb here |||||{
The results in Table IVb show that both single-segment and conglomerate¯rms are very sensitive to their productivity relative to their industry competitors. Comparing the results for single-segment¯rms and conglomerate¯rms' main divisions, we¯nd that there is little economic di®erence in the predicted growth rates. There is an even smaller in predicted growth rates when we predict growth rates holding constant the underlying data across regressions. This result can be seen when we predict growth for the single-segment¯rms using the data from the main divisions combined with the coe±cients from the single-segment rms. Table V here |||||{
E. Segment Capital Expenditures
The results in Table V show that both conglomerate and single-segment¯rm's investment is sensitive to the productivity and fundamental industry factors. Especially interesting is the fact that the interaction of productivity with industry shipments is more signi¯cant for peripheral¯rms than it is for main divisions. These¯ndings reinforce the conclusion that there is no evidence that conglomerate¯rms insulate their peripheral divisions. We also¯nd that interaction of relative demand and the¯rm's other segments' productivity is negative and signi¯cant as predicted by our model. We do not¯nd evidence of cross-subsidization.
Overall, the results suggest that conglomerate¯rms take into account the prospects of other divisions when allocating resources. The consistency of these¯ndings shows the robustness of our results. We¯nd that the growth rate of both main and peripheral segments responds positively to segment productivity and industry variables that capture the fundamental prospects for that division. Especially in peripheral segments, segment growth is dependent on productivity in both the division and the other divisions. These¯ndings do not support the conclusion that conglomerate¯rms ine±ciently allocate resources to peripheral divisions.
F. Robustness Tests: a. Alternative Measures of E±ciency
To make sure that our results are not dependent on our measurement of productivity Table VI examines the growth of multiple-segment¯rms using two di®erent measures of e±ciency. We construct segment value added per worker and segment operating margin. Value added per worker is sales less materials divided by the number of workers. Operating margin is sales less materials cost of goods sold, employee costs, and capital expenditures divided by sales. Both value added per worker and operating margin are also industry adjusted in each year.
|||||{
Insert Table VI here |||||{
The results in Table VI show that multiple-segment resource allocation remains sensitive to the e±ciency measure and the interaction of industry shipments with this measure. Firms allocate more resources to their best divisions in good times. We also¯nd that interaction of relative demand and the¯rm's other segments' productivity are negative as predicted by our model. We do not¯nd evidence of cross-subsidization. There are several explanations for the di®erences between our results and prior work. First, all of our data is at the plantlevel and is then aggregated up to the 3 digit industry level. Thus, we can more accurately assess segment cash°ows and segment prospects. Second, we include variables that directly measure the industry conditions. Finally, our sample of¯rms is more comprehensive than previous studies.
b. Does the Extent of Diversi¯cation Matter?
We now examine whether the extent of diversi¯cation a®ects conglomerate¯rms' growth and investment. Table VIII examines both growth and investment for conglomerates when we interact productivity with a¯rm's segment her¯ndahl.
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The her¯ndahl computes ā rm's dispersion across the segments it operates by summing the squared shares of total rm sales for each segment. We measure a¯rm's segment her¯ndahl both at the two and three digit SIC code level.
|||||{
Insert Table VII here |||||{
The signi¯cance of the results for investment in Table VII depend on whether the her¯nd-ahl is measured at the two or three-digit SIC code. At the two-digit level, her¯ndahl interacted with productivity is insigni¯cant for segment growth and investment. Other results are similar to those reported in previous tables. However at the three-digit level we¯nd that the sensitivity of investment increases with a¯rm's segment her¯ndahl. Two potential interpretations can be made from these¯ndings. One interpretation, consistent with our model, is that the three-digit level her¯ndahl proxies for productivity. Segments at the three-digit level are more related and¯rms that choose to produce in closely related segments may have higher skill overall, that is not picked up by an individual segment's productivity measure. However, another interpretation is that an increase in¯rm focus has bene¯ts in increasing its sensitivity to productivity.
c. Conglomerates which restructure
The preceding tables examine resource allocation, taking the organizational form of¯rms as given. We now test whether the relation between growth and productivity for this set of rms di®ers from that conglomerates that still remain conglomerates at the end of our sample. Our hypothesis is that our model will hold better for these surviving conglomerates. In order to test this hypothesis, we identify conglomerates which experience signi¯cant restructuring including those that become single-segment¯rms. We de¯ne signi¯cant restructuring as a 25 percent or greater decrease in the number of segments a conglomerate operates by 1992, the last year of our data. In addition, we spilt conglomerates that begin the period with two and three segments and those conglomerates that begin with more than three segments. We make this split to investigate if it is just conglomerates with few divisions, that experiment with diversi¯cation and fail, that are diving our results. |||||{ Insert Table VIII here |||||{
The results in Table VIII show that our model does not hold in the period prior to the restructuring for conglomerates that experience signi¯cant restructuring. We¯nd that there is an insigni¯cant relation between growth and the interaction of change in shipments and own segment TFP and also an insigni¯cant relation between growth and the interaction of relative demand and other segments' weighted TFP. This is true for both conglomerates that begin with only 2-3 segments and those with greater than three segments. We alsō nd no e®ect on growth for other segments' weighted TFP for these conglomerates that are broken up.
In contrast both of these interaction variables are signi¯cant for conglomerates which are not broken up. We¯nd a positive signi¯cant relation between growth and the interaction between TFP and change in shipments and also a negative, signi¯cant relation between growth and the interaction between other segments' TFP and relative demand. We alsō nd a negative, signi¯cant e®ect on segment growth of other segment relative productivity for the conglomerates that are not broken up. This evidence suggests that there is a subset of conglomerates that behave ine±ciently, perhaps as a result of agency problems, and are therefore broken up.
Thus, we do¯nd some evidence consistent with agency problems in conglomerate¯rms. However, even for these¯rms, we do not¯nd a signi¯cant positive coe±cient between other segments' relative productivity and growth. Thus we¯nd no evidence that these conglomerates signi¯cantly subsidize the growth of ine±cient divisions. For conglomerates that survive we¯nd evidence of behavior consistent with our model. The results suggest that over our sample period, surviving conglomerates, which comprise the majority of conglomerates, grow e±ciently across business segments.
An alternative indicator of industry prospects is industry q. Our model predicts that the sign will be negative when q is interacted with the other divisions' segment-level relative productivity. We proxy for industry prospects using an industry Tobin's q constructed by weighting individual single{segment¯rm q's from COMPUSTAT. Note that we are using this variable to capture industry demand prospects -not to measure individual segment skill. To attempt the latter would confound two e®ects in our model: an individual¯rm's relative skill (versus a single-segment¯rm) in an industry and also the demand prospects in that industry. One other problem arose. In many industries COMPUSTAT does not have data for a su±cient number of single-segment¯rms (our requirement was a minimum of four rms) to construct a benchmark for many of three-digit SIC codes in our data. For the subset of data with su±cient competitors, the results of the estimation for conglomerate¯rms had similar signi¯cance and signs as those of our earlier results. Given space considerations, we do not report these results. We¯nd a negative relation between a segment's growth and other segments' weighted Tobin's q interacted with our segment-level productivity variable.
IV. Comparability of Our Results with Other Research
Prior studies have used industry q measured using single-segment¯rms to proxy for investment opportunities for conglomerate¯rms. This assumption requires that¯rms have homogeneous investment opportunities. Our approach explicitly allows for di®erence in organizational ability which causes di®erent types of¯rms to have di®erences in measured productivity. Empirically we show that conglomerates have systematically di®erent productivity. Except for the smallest size¯rms, conglomerates have lower productivity than single-segment¯rms of similar sizes.
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Our¯nding of lower productivity is consistent with a conglomerate discount documented by Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995) . However, our interpretation is that the discount arises even when¯rms are maximizing value, so that¯rm's decisions to diversify 28 A recent study by Schoar (1999) ¯nds that plants of conglomerate¯rms have higher productivity. However, our measure of productivity includes a¯xed e®ect and the samples are di®erent. Schoar uses as sample of conglomerates matched to COMPUSTAT that exist in 1987, while we have conglomerates throughout the period including those that are broken up prior to 1987. Our evidence on bustups shows that the least productive conglomerates are busted up. Also¯rms that are more likely to have been matched are the larger conglomerate¯rms, which we do¯nd are very productive. On our larger sample, we ran a regression of TFP on one minus the her¯ndahl and found a U shaped relationship. may be optimal even when there is a discount.
Di®erences in productivity have also been shown to impact merger and acquisition decisions. Maksimovic and Phillips' (2001) show that the productivity of the purchased and sold assets, in conjunction with relative demand shocks, predict the probability of sale and the subsequent productivity gain.
29 Schlingemann, Stulz, and Walking (2000) show that conglomerates are more likely to sell peripheral divisions that are poorly performing. Consistent with our evidence, they also¯nd that the extent of diversi¯cation is not, by itself, signi¯cant in explaining disinvestment decisions. Several other recent studies also show that conglomerates acquire and sell assets that are di®erent than the median single-segment¯rm and these di®erences may cause a conglomerate discount. Chevalier (1999) shows that target¯rms that choose to merge across SIC codes invested before their merger di®erently from¯rms that remain single-segment. Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (1999) show that conglomerate¯rms purchase¯rms that have a lower value than the acquisitions' single-segment counterparts.
We also show that conditional on di®erential productivity, the growth and investment decisions of conglomerates are consistent with e±cient allocation of resources. Firms grow their more productive divisions when those divisions experience a positive demand shock and shrink these divisions when other divisions are more productive and they experience positive relative demand shocks. It thus di®ers in spirit from recent research on investment allocation in conglomerates, for example, by Shin and Stulz (1998) and Scharfstein (1997) . They¯nd that divisions in conglomerates invest more than their stand-alone industry peers in bad industries and invest less than their stand-alone peers in high industries. The di®erences may arise because we control for productivity at the divisional level, whereas these by papers rely on industry q. Our¯ndings may still be consistent with the prior results if conglomerates are less productive on average than single-segment¯rms in industries with high growth potential.
Our¯nding of high sensitivity of peripheral divisions to productivity is also consistent with the predictions of Stein (1997) and Matsusaka (2001) in which conglomerates allocate resources across divisions to their best divisions. Our results hold both at the three-digit SIC code level reported in this paper and also at the two-and four-digit levels (not reported). Wē nd that peripheral units of conglomerates are less productive than the main units, but that there is little evidence that peripheral growth is ine±cient. This pattern is consistent with our neoclassical model of¯rms' comparative advantage. However, this¯nding of negative relative productivity of conglomerates' peripheral divisions is also consistent with conglomerates having lower¯xed costs of entry and lower costs of evaluating new ventures than do singlesegment¯rms. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) argue that distortion of investment increases with the diversi¯cation of the conglomerate when dispersion in q's across¯rm segments is higher.
We also¯nd some more limited evidence for a diversi¯cation e®ect: As the her¯ndahl of the segment shares increases at the three-digit level, the sensitivity of investment to relative productivity also increases. However, we do not¯nd evidence that the sensitivity of¯rm investment to other divisions' relative productivity is a®ected by focus.
V. Conclusions
Our paper explores how fundamental industry conditions and productivity in°uence segment growth for both single industry and multiple-segment conglomerate¯rms. We test hypotheses derived from a neoclassical model of¯rm activity in multiple markets with decreasing returns-to-scale from organizational ability. The model yields predictions about rm-size distributions of focused single-industry and multiple-segment¯rms as a function of rms' comparative advantage and industry demand shocks. We have three key empirical¯ndings. First, we¯nd that conglomerate¯rms are less productive than are single-segment¯rms of a similar size, except for¯rms of the smallest size. This di®erence is mainly driven by smaller peripheral divisions of the conglomerate, which show signi¯cantly lower productivity than do main segments.
Second, we¯nd that the productivity pattern within a conglomerate¯rm's divisions is consistent with our simple value-maximizing model. The largest divisions of conglomerates with multiple segments are particularly e±cient. This evidence supports the hypothesis that rms invest in industries in which they have a comparative advantage. This is consistent with optimal resource allocation decisions by conglomerates and also with the conglomerate discount being endogenous. The evidence is consistent with conglomerates having a discount because of lower productivity, not necessarily because of agency problems. Less-productivē rms can exist in equilibrium because of decreasing returns-to-scale. Third, examining growth of¯rm segments, we¯nd that the growth of productive and unproductive¯rm segments (both for single-segment¯rms and conglomerate¯rms) is consistent with the model of e±cient growth across business segments. Segment growth is strongly related to fundamental industry factors and individual segment productivity. Conglomeratē rms grow less in a particular segment if their other segment(s) is more productive and if their other segment(s) experiences a larger positive demand shock. The di®erential pattern of productivity and conglomerate growth across conglomerates' business segments, as well as a conglomerate discount, are consistent with a neoclassical model.
Our evidence is not consistent with conglomerates subsidizing less productive divisions using resources from other divisions. Instead, peripheral segments are often marginal divisions whose growth declines when they have negative productivity.
We do¯nd some evidence that is consistent with some conglomerates having agency problems. We identify a subset of conglomerate¯rms whose growth decisions are, a priori, less likely to be consistent with our model of optimizing behavior. This subset comprises of conglomerates that were broken up during the 1980s. We¯nd that the growth of these broken-up conglomerates is not consistent with our model of optimal growth. However, even for these¯rms, we¯nd no evidence that conglomerates signi¯cantly subsidize the growth of ine±cient divisions. As noted earlier, there may still be ine±ciencies from higher overhead and other dissipative measures. Our evidence shows that majority of conglomerate¯rms exhibit growth across business segments that is consistent with optimal behavior. Sample characteristics of firms' industry operating segments. We calculate statistics from plant-level data aggregated into 3-digit SIC codes for each firm. We classify single-segment versus multiple-segment firms based on 3-digit SIC codes. For multiple-segment firms, main segments are segments that represent at least 25% of the firm's total shipments. We base size classifications on the previous year's real value of industry shipments relative to each industry's median value of shipments. We determine recession and expansion years using aggregate detrended industrial production. Recession years are years in which both real and detrended industrial production decline relative to the previous year. We classify years as expansion years when both real and detrended industrial production increase relative to the previous year. Recession years (1981) (1982) (1990) (1991) All industry segments -5.15% -0.01% -5.48% Firms' most productive segments d -3.54%
1.57% -4.06% (top 50th percentile of TFP by industry) Expansion years (1976) (1977) (1978) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) All industry segments 2.46% 7.30% 2.60% Firms' most productive segments d 5.99% 9.66% 4.35% (top 50th percentile of TFP by industry) a Productivity is total factor productivity (TFP) and is a relative measure of productivity. TFPs are standardized by dividing each TFP by the standard deviation of the industry's TFP at the 3-digit level.
Table II Growth and Productivity over the Business Cycle
Sample characteristics of firms' industry operating segments in Expansion Years. Statistics are calculated from plant-level data aggregated into three digit SIC codes for each firm. Single segment versus multiple segment firms are based on threedigit SIC codes. For multiple segment firms, main segments are segments which are at least 25 percent of the firm's total shipments. Size classifications are based on previous years real value of industry shipments and are relative to each industry's median value of shipments. Number of segments is for the beginning of the period. Expansion (recession) years are years in which both real and detrended aggregate industrial production increase (decrease) relative to the previous year. a Significantly different from multiple segment firms at less than the 5 percent level using a 2-tailed test for a significant difference from 0.
b Significant difference between main and peripheral segments at less than the 5 percent level using a 2-tailed test for a difference from 0.
c Productivity is Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and is a relative measure of productivity. TFPs are standardized by dividing each TFP by the standard deviation of the industry's TFP at the 3-digit level.
Table III Segment Growth
Regressions test the effects of plant-level productivity and industry-level demand on firm industry segment sales growth for single-segment and multiple-segment firms. The dependent variable, segment growth, is industry adjusted in each year. Segment size and productivity are are industry adjusted in each year. Real industry shipments is detrended by regressing industry shipments (in 1987 dollars) on a yearly time trend. In column two (three) multiple-segment firms are firms with at least two segments each with 2.5 percent (10 percent) of their total shipments. Data are aggregated into firm three-digit SIC codes for industry segments from underlying plant-level data. We estimate the regressions using unbalanced panel regressions allowing for correlated residuals within panel units. Significance tests are conducted using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors following Huber-White. Data are yearly from 1979 to 1992. Observations are included for growth rates less than one-hundred percent and for firms whose real value of shipments is greater than one million dollars. (p-values a, b, c : Significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. e Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is calculated using a translog production function.
Table IV Segment Growth
Regressions test the effects of plant-level productivity and industry-level demand on firm industry segment sales growth for main and peripheral segment of multiple-segment firms. The dependent variable, firm segment growth, is industry adjusted in each year. Segment size and productivity are are industry adjusted in each year. Real industry shipments is detrended by regressing industry shipments (in 1987 dollars) on a yearly time trend.
Multiple-segment firms are firms with at least two segments each with 10 percent of their total shipments. Data are aggregated into firm three-digit SIC codes for industry segments from underlying plant-level data. We estimate the regressions using unbalanced panel regressions allowing for correlated residuals within panel units. Significance tests are conducted using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors following Huber-White. Significance Level (p-value) 0.010 <1% a, b, c : Significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. e Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is calculated using a translog production function.
Table IV b Economic Significance of Regression Results
Predicted real growth rates of conglomerate and single-segment firms as productivity and change in shipments *size varies from the 25th to the 75th percentiles. We compute these predicted growth rates holding all variables except productivity and change in industry shipments*size at their sample medians.
Predicted Real Growth Rates using coefficient estimates from Table III and Table IV a, b, c : Significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. e Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is calculated using a translog production function.
Table VI Growth and Alternative Measures of Efficiency
Regressions test the effects of plant-level value added per worker and cash flow on firm industry segment sales growth for multiple-segment firms. The dependent variable, firm segment growth, is industry adjusted in each year. Value added per worker and operating margin are also industry adjusted in each year. Value added is sales less materials cost of good sold divided by the number of workers. Operating margin is sales less materials cost of goods sold, employee costs, and capital expenditures divided by sales. Real industry shipments is detrended by regressing industry shipments (in 1982 dollars) on a yearly time trend. Multiple-segment firms are firms with at least two segments each with 10 percent of their total shipments. Data are aggregated into firm three-digit SIC codes for industry segments from underlying plant-level data. We estimate the regressions using unbalanced panel regressions allowing for fixed effects and correlated residuals within panel units. Significance tests are conducted using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Data are yearly from [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] a, b, c : Significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. d Other segments' efficiency is a weighted average of the firm's other segment(s) weighted by the segment(s) output.
e Relative industry demand is interacted with other segments' efficiency and equals one (zero, minus one) when the segment's change in shipments at the industry level is greater (equal, less) than that of the firm's median segment.
Table VII Extent of Conglomerate Diversification
Regressions test whether the extent of diversification influences segment resource allocation for multiple-segment firms. The extent of diversification is captured by a firm "herfindahl". This herfindahl is the sum of squared segment sales divided by total firm sales. The dependent variable in column one is firm segment growth while the dependent variable in column two is segment capital expenditures scaled by beginning of period capital stock. Real industry shipments is detrended by regressing industry shipments (in 1982 dollars) on a yearly time trend. Industry averages are subtracted in each year for both dependent variables. Segment size and productivity are also industry adjusted in each year. Data areaggregated into firm three-digit SIC codes for industry segments from underlying plant-level data. We estimate the regressions using unbalanced panel regressions allowing for correlated residuals within panel units. Significance tests are conducted using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. Observations are included for growth rates less than one-hundred percent and capital expenditures less than the beginning of period capital stock. Regressions are limited to firms whose real value of shipments is greater than ten million dollars. a, b, c : Significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. e Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is calculated using a translog production function.
Table VIII Conglomerate Firms that Restructure
Regressions test the effects of plant-level productivity and industry-level demand on firm industry segment sales growth. We separate out firms that have had major restructuring over the period. Firms are classified as having underwent major restructuring if they decrease the number of segments they operate by more than 25 percent by the last year they are in the database. The dependent variable, firm segment growth, is industry adjusted in each year. Real industry shipments is detrended by regressing industry shipments (in 1982 dollars) on a yearly time trend. Segment size and productivity are also industry adjusted in each year. Data are aggregated into three-digit SIC codes for industry segments from underlying plant-level data. We estimate the regressions using unbalanced panel regressions allowing for correlated residuals within panel units. Significance tests are conducted using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors following Huber-White. Data are yearly from 1979 to 1992. Observations are included for growth rates less than one-hundred percent and for firms whose real value of shipments is greater than one million dollars. (p-values a, b, c : Significantly different from 0 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively, using a 2-tailed test. e Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is calculated using a translog production function.
